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]RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ANTI-OBSCENITY LEGISLATION
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959)
Prodded by the District Attorney, three state policemen attended a
showing of the film "Uncover Girls" at the Ideal Drive-In Theatre in
Greenfield Township, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, on the evening
of October 12, 1956.' After viewing the movie, they closed the theatre,
confiscated the film and arrested the manager, Blumenstein, for having
unlawfully exhibited an obscene motion picture under a Pennsylvania
statute which provided that:
Whoever gives or participates in or being the owner of any premise,
or having control thereof, permits within or on said premises . . . the
exhibition of fixed or moving pictures of lascivious, sacrilegious, ob-
scene, indecent or immoral nature and character, or such as might tend
to corrupt morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor....
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein was heard without a jury in the Court
of Quarter Sessions, and two reels of the confiscated film were exhibited
in the courtroom. The trial judge found Blumenstein guilty3 He based
the decision on his personal belief that the film sections "depicted a series
of dancing acts, which were definitely cheap, lewd, obscene and inde-
cent .... " The Superior Court viewed the film and affirmed Blumen-
stein's conviction, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on
the ground that the statute upon which the conviction was based was un-
constitutional for vagueness.'
In rendering its decision the court was faced with the problem of
reconciling the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Roth v.
United States' with a series of that Court's memorandum opinions' which
considered obscenity statutes. The Pennsylvania court's answer to the
1. The uncut version of this film, the version under consideration here, had previously been
refused approval by the Board of Censors under authority of the Motion Picture Censorship
Act, Pa. Laws 1915, act 534, as amended, Pa. Laws 1929 act 1655. However, this act was
found unconstitutional on March 13, 1956 in Hallmark Productions, Inc., v. Carroll, 384 Pa.
348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956) some five months prior to the showing of "Uncover Girls" at the
Ideal Drive-In Theatre.
2. Pa. Laws 1939, act 872, § 528, as amended, PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4528 (Supp. 1960).
This act was found unconstitutional and the amendment resulted from the decision in the
principal case, Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959).
3. No. 8, Court of Quarter Sessions, Pa., Dec., T., 1956.
4. Ibid. Also quoted in 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 85 (1957).
5. 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 83 (1958).
6. 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959).
7. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Holmby Productions v. Vaughn,
350 U.S. 870 (1955); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education of the State of Ohio,
346 U.S. 587 (1954).
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problem is important, for it clarifies, at least for that state, the require-
ments of a constitutional obscenity statute, while at the same time it en-
dorses a new requirement for consideration in other states.
In Roth v. United States the court held that obscenity was not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press and set up the test
for judging obscenity as "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest."9  Nevertheless, the Court
upheld two anti-obscenity statutes on the basis of what it then considered
appropriate charges by the trial courts, even though the charges differed
from the test developed by the case itself.1" At the same time in a series
of memorandum opinions," both before and after Roth, the Court held
statutes similar to those involved in Roth and in the present case uncon-
stitutional although accompanied by allegedly appropriate, though varied,
charges as to the definition of the word "obscene" by the trial courts.
However, none of the obscenity tests used in these charges followed word
for word the test of obscenity adopted by the Court in Roth. 2 In view
of these decisions and in view of Roth it became difficult to determine
exactly what statute accompanied by what charge would be found ac-
ceptable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (perhaps
reflecting developments in the United States Supreme Court) decided,
logically, that the way to avoid such confusion and to be certain of not
incurring a charge of obscurity is simply to make the Roth test manda-
tory. And it is implying, by basing its decision on statutory construction,
that the Roth test must be incorporated in the anti-obscenity statute it-
self. This goes beyond Roth where the court, while in the very process
of setting up the standard under discussion, managed to tolerate, at that
9. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
10. "The words 'obscene, lewd, and lascivious' as used in the law, signify that form of im-
morality which has relation to sexual impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,"
and "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or
arousing lustful desires." Id. at 486. But see 489-90.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) provides that:
"A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to the prurient
interest, i.e., shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substanti-
ally beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. A
thing is obscene even if the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs.
Obscenity shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it shall be judged with
reference to children or other specially susceptible audience if it appears from the character of
the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be especially designed for or directed
to such an audience .. "
This quotation from the Model Penal Code seems to be the basis for the Roth test of obscen-
ity, yet it is interesting to note that the trial court instructions, also accepted by Roth, incorporat-
ing the traditional tests of tendency to corrupt or tendency to arouse lustful thoughts are specif-
ically rejected by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2), comment 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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time anyway, two very dissimilar tests of obscenity by the trial courts."3
Thus, by making the Roth test mandatory the Blumenstein court was able
to avoid the inconsistency of the Roth court, and in so doing, it found a
statute similar to the statutes upheld in Roth 4 to be unconstitutional.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its decision, principally, upon
an analysis of its anti-obscenity statute. Therefore, any special interpre-
tation of the word "obscene" given by the trial court was of no impor-
tance to the higher court in arriving at its decision, nor did it show any
interest in the film itself. The court simply considered the words of the
statute, "lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral .. .or
such as might tend to corrupt morals," and indicated their inadequacy by
citing Supreme Court decisions 5 in which these words had been found
wanting on grounds of vagueness. These decisions were not, however,
crucial to the interest of the court.
Some five months after the decision in the Roth case, the Supreme
Court, citing Roth, in Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago'8 re-
versed, per curiam, a decision of the Circuit Court which had held:
... the ordinance now under attack, as we have seen, uses the words
"immoral" or "obscene." The Illinois Supreme Court has held, in speak-
ing of this ordinance, that these words are synonymous and that a mo-
tion picture is obscene or immoral, within the meaning of the ordinance,
if, when considered as a whole, its calculated effect is substantially to
arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to
outweigh whatever artistic or other merits the film may possess. With
this interpretation of the words "obscene" and "immoral" read into the
ordinance now before us, we believe the ordinance is not vague, as con-
tended by plaintiff. Those words are precise and they constitute a proper
test in the case at bar.17
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania believed that if this standard in the
Times Film case could not pass the Roth test, certainly section 528"8 of
its Penal Code, under which Blumenstein was convicted, could not either.
The question presented in Blumenstein is whether the Roth test must
be literally applied in regarding an obscenity problem, to the exclusion
of all other tests or standards, and, if so, whether this test can be implied
in the anti-obscenity statute or whether it must be incorporated, word for
word, into the statute itself. As a result of the confusion presented by
Roth and as a result of the added enigma presented by the Times Film
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made the obvious and logical de-
13. See note 10 supra.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1954); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. 311 (1955).
15. Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955); Superior Films v. Department
of Education of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587 (1945); Burstyn v. Wilson, 342 U.S. 495 (1952).
16. 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
17. 244 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 1957).
18. See note 2 supra.
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cision. The court found its statute unconstitutional for reasons of ob-
scurity and set up the Roth test as the sole standard by which to measure
obscenity. Three months later the Pennsylvania Legislature did incorpo-
rate the Roth test, word for word, into the very statute declared uncon-
stitutional in Blumenstein.19
The decision is significant, therefore, in that it clarifies the precise
position of the Roth test in one state. It has already become, in part, the
basis for holding a second statute unconstitutional: in Goldman v. State
Board of Motion Picture Control" and in Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corporation v. Boehm2 the court, citing Blumenstein and applying Roth,
struck down Pennsylvania's brand new Motion Picture Censorship Act. 2
Furthermore, the Blumenstein decision now burdens other states with the
probable necessity of deciding whether to imply or incorporate Roth into
their anti-obscenity legislation.
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein is already knocking on Ohio's door,
and rightly so, for Ohio is a state uncertain in its approach to anti-
obscenity legislation and is thus vulnerable to an attack based on the logic
and simple directness of the Pennsylvania decision. In fact, Ohio is sus-
ceptible three times over, for it has three awkward statutes in this area:
a Motion Picture Censorship Act,23 a statute prohibiting the sale or
possession of obscene literature,24 and a special statute prohibiting the
exhibition of obscene motion pictures. 5
In R.K.O. Radio Pictures v. Department of Education6 a majority of
five judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio were of the opinion that the
Supreme Court of the United States in Superior Films v. Department of
Education of the State of Ohio2" had in effect found the Ohio Motion
Picture Censorship Act to be contrary to the first and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. However, since six members
of the Ohio court must agree to declare an act unconstitutional, the act
still remains in effect.2" Likewise in State v. Mapp29 four of the judges
felt that the second obscenity statute, prohibiting the sale or possession
of obscene literature, was unconstitutional. The necessary majority to so
19. Ibid.
20. No. 530 Commonwealth Docket No. 2385, C.P., Dauphin County, Pa., July 30, 1960.
21. No. 538 Commonwealth Docket No. 2387, C.P., Dauphin County, Pa., July 30, 1960.
22. Pa. Laws 1959, act 358.
23. OHIO REv. CODE ch. 3305.
24. OHio REv. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1960).
25. OHo REv. CODE § 2905.342 (Supp. 1960).
26. 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
27. 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
28. OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 2. But see Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 364 U.S. 805
(1961).
29. 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), appeal docketed, No. 236, U.S. Sup. Ct.,
July 14, 1960, jurisdiction noted, October 24, 1960.
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declare was once again lacking. Therefore, a majority of the judges of
the Supreme Court of Ohio believe that two of Ohio's three obscenity
statutes are unconstitutional yet are powerless to affect a remedy. 0 The
third statute, prohibiting obscene movies, has not as yet been tested in
the Ohio Supreme Court, but it appears even more susceptible to consti-
tutional attack on the ground of obscurity, for the statute simply prohibits
the exhibition of obscene movies with no qualifying or restrictive words
of any kind to guide a lower court in its decision.31 Clearly, the Ohio
law in this area is inadequate.
If, as in Pennsylvania, the Roth test is made the mandatory standard
by statute in Ohio, would not some of the ambiguity and confusion sur-
rounding the recent Ohio decisions be alleviated? Such legislation might
not directly solve the Ohio censorship problem or the scienter problem
involved in the Mapp case, 2 but it might ultimately aid in their solution
(in the same way in which Blumenstein deared the air for the subse-
quent decisions on the movie censorship problem in Pennsylvania).
Moreover, it would avoid future confusion of the type involved in a
recent Ohio decision33 wherein the court, being specifically challenged
with the simplicity and directness of the Blumenstein argument, defen-
sively admitted that the Roth test was now mandatory.34 The court then
went to the most laborious and incredulous lengths in an attempt to show
that although the Ohio anti-obscenity statute was enacted subsequent to
the decision in Roth and although there was no standard remotely re-
sembling Roth embodied in this statute, that nevertheless, the Ohio
Legislature intended and did imply the Roth test into the statute at the
time it was enacted.3 5 Such a decision merely adds to the confusion and
constitutional burden of these Ohio statutes. It would seem that the
Pennsylvania incorporation of Roth into its statute is honest on its face
in view of the enigmatic position of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and such incorporation in Ohio would, at the very least, simplify
30. It might be pointed out that these two statutes use words similar to or at least as suscepti-
ble to a charge of vagueness as those found unconstitutional in Pennsylvania. OHIo REv. CODE
§ 2905.34 provides that "no person shall knowingly sell, lend, give away, or exhibit. . . or have
in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, magazine, pam.
phlet...." OHIo REv. CODE § 3305.04 provides that the Censorship Board will approve
only "such films as are, in... [its] judgment, of a moral, educational, or amusing or harmless
character...."
31. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.342 (Supp. 1960) provides that "no person shall produce, sell,
lease, lend, give away, or distribute for the purpose of exhibition, or exhibit, or have in pos-
session or under his immediate control for any purpose... (A) an obscene motion picture
film .... "
32. 170 Ohio St. 427, 433, 166 N.E.2d 387, 391 (1960), appeal docketed, No. 236, U.S.
Sup. Ct., July 14, 1960, jurisdiction noted, October 24, 1960.
33. State v. Mahoning Valley Distributing Agency, Inc., 169 NE.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
34. Id. at 60, 62.
35. Id. at 60. 61.
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